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State Dept. review completed

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
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1. BRITISH AND FRENCH ANNOUNCE DECISION TO WITHDRAW FORCES FROM EGYPT

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Foreign Secretary Lloyd and Foreign Minister Pineau have announced that Britain and France will withdraw their troops from the Suez Canal zone "without delay." Lloyd told the American embassy in London on 2 December that the French were opposed to announcing a specific date for completion of the with-

drawal, but that Secretary General Hammarskjold was being informed that the withdrawal would be finished by 18 December.

Lloyd told the embassy that the Conservative government "may well fall" because of the decision. He indicated that he was "less than sanguine" about the results of the cabinet's week-end efforts to marshal its parliamentary support. In this connection, Lloyd stated that it would be helpful if the UN could utilize some of the canal clearing equipment assembled by Britain and France.

Comment

Lloyd's tone suggests that the cabinet group now handling affairs doubts that it can continue in office much longer. The French government has indicated it still hopes to delay completion of the withdrawal to ease its position in the foreign policy debate scheduled to begin 18 December.

The Nasr regime, while hailing the Anglo-French announcement as a victory for Egypt, is likely to continue pressing for a public commitment on a specific withdrawal deadline before agreeing to canal clearing operations by the UN. Its propaganda in this respect will make the British Conservatives' problem still more difficult.

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5. POLISH COMMUNISTS REPORTEDLY SEEK CONTACTS WITH SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the Polish United
Workers' (Communist) Party (PZPR) wants close contact
with the Socialist International. [REDACTED] former Polish
Socialists who had never joined the PZPR were now doing so
and that many now held important posts. [REDACTED] most
PZPR members were no longer Marxist-Leninist in outlook
but "reformist in the Western sense." [REDACTED]

Comment

Although the Soviet Union has been inter-
ested in improving bloc relations with
individual Socialist parties, it is less likely to favor bloc rela-
tions with the Socialist International, particularly in the case
of Poland.

The Gomulka regime has openly encouraged
Socialist participation in party affairs as a means of winning
additional popular favor, [REDACTED]

Leaders of the Socialist International will
probably want to encourage any signs of independence within
the Soviet bloc, but they have in general discouraged formal
Socialist-Communist contacts. Last September they post-
poned indefinitely the question of establishing ties with the
Yugoslav party.

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6. FRENCH ENVOY PREDICTS UPHEAVAL IN BULGARIA

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The French Foreign Ministry believes Bulgaria is "ripe for troubles and will probably be the next Satellite to blow up!" According to the French minister in

Sofia, arrests have taken place, although on a smaller scale than rumored, and at least one concentration camp has been reopened.

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Comment

Discontent among workers, students and intellectuals is reportedly widespread.

There is no indication, however, that these dissident elements have gained control of organizations similar to those through which Polish and Hungarian dissidents operated.

Although some factionalism exists at the middle and upper levels of the party, it does not appear to be sufficiently strong to challenge party leaders, who are making a determined effort to control the situation through arrests and minor economic concessions. Premier Yugov reiterated on 1 December the necessity for continuing the present ideological indoctrination, which he admitted was being opposed by elements among Bulgarian youth.

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7. NEW UPRISINGS FORECAST IN NORTH VIETNAM

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New uprisings in North Vietnam similar to the recent riots near Vinh are considered likely in the near future.

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Popular discontent is allegedly very strong in the vicinity of Haiphong, North Vietnam's primary port. heavy taxation seems to be the main complaint and that there appears to be a willingness to risk harsh repression in case of an uprising because "nothing could be worse" than present conditions. "How can I get to South Vietnam?" is the most common question asked of foreigners.

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the regular army appears loyal to the regime, which is very attentive to the welfare of the troops.

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Comment

While new outbreaks during the next few months are quite possible, Hanoi appears confident of the army's ability to keep the situation from getting out of hand. Nevertheless, the apparent inability of the Communists to consolidate their control over the population or to obtain Vietnamese unification foreshadows continued severe internal problems for the Viet Minh leadership.

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